Dynamic configuration of settings in response to ddos attack

ABSTRACT

A system can monitor the server for indications of an attack and adjusts server settings accordingly. In response, the system can increase server tolerance in a systematic way to deal with DDoS by adjusting server settings appropriately. Conversely, when the server is not under attack, the settings can be adjusted to those for standard operations (e.g., adjusted downward), as they are more optimal for normal, non-attack operations.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This non-provisional application claims the benefit of priority toco-pending U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/050,056, filedSep. 12, 2014, titled “DYNAMIC CONFIGURATION OF SETTINGS IN RESPONSE TODDOS ATTACK,” (attorney docket no. 0544-US-P1), wherein the entirecontents of which are fully incorporated by reference herein for allpurposes.

BACKGROUND

In a distributed network like the Internet, different computers andcomputer networks may be virtually connected and accessible via variousroutes. When a computer server is under attack, e.g., a distributeddenial of service (DDoS) attack, responses to the attack must be made inorder to maintain the associated computer network's accessibility toother networks and computers. When such attacks occur, a largepercentage of a server's resources get used up, and the default serversettings are not adequate to absorb the attack, which can hurtmitigation efforts to keep the server up and increase recovery time.

Embodiments of the invention address these and other problems,individually and collectively.

BRIEF SUMMARY

Techniques are provided for automatically adjusting settings of a serverin response to a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. Forexample, transport layer settings (e.g., TCP settings) can be adjustedautomatically. Although specific examples discuss adjusting TCP settings(also referred to as TCP hardening), embodiment are applicable to othersettings (also called parmeters) in response to an attack.

Embodiments (e.g., TCP hardening) can increase the availability of aserver's TCP layer to new connections during a Layer 4 (i.e. thetransportation layer) DDoS attack. TCP Hardening techniques can beeffective in maintaining the connectivity of a server under an OSI Level4 attack, such as a SYN flood, where an attacker sends a succession ofSYN requests to a target server in an attempt to consume enoughresources to make the server unresponsive to legitimate traffic. Asystem can monitor the server for indications of an attack and adjustsserver settings accordingly. In response, the system can increase servertolerance in a systematic way to deal with DDoS by adjusting serversettings appropriately. Conversely, when the server is not under attack,the settings can be adjusted to those for standard operations (e.g.,adjusted downward), as they are more optimal for normal, non-attackoperations.

Other embodiments are directed to systems, portable consumer devices,and computer readable media associated with methods described herein.

A better understanding of the nature and advantages of embodiments ofthe present invention may be gained with reference to the followingdetailed description and the accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a flowchart showing polling system state and updating serverparameters.

FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of an example computer system usable withsystem and methods according to embodiments of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

When a DDoS attack occurs, a server can be overwhelmed. Embodiments canautomatically adjust the settings in response to the attack, e.g.,increase or decrease a setting when an attack is occurring and increaseor decrease the setting when there is not attack.

I. Transport Layer Attacks

The Internet is a collection of connected machines. Generally, eachmachine on the Internet can be categorized as one of two types, either aserver or a client. Those machines that provide services (e.g., thosethat are used to host a website for other machines to connect to) areconsidered servers. Client machines are those are the machines that areused to connect to those services are clients. If a server is under aDDoS attack, then it may not be available for the desired clientmachines to connect to, and cannot serve its purpose.

Communication over the Internet is often described with respect to theOpen Systems Interconnection model (OSI), as is known to one skilled inthe art. Although embodiments are not limited to the OSI model,discussions below may refer to the OSI model for ease of discussion.Common transport layer protocols are TCP (transport control protocol)and UDP (user datagram protocol).

A goal of a Layer 4 attack is to fill up the session (or connection)table. Servers have a connection table that tracks sessions, and whenall of the connections that are allocated are exhausted, the servercannot open any more sessions to clients, effectively denying access tothe server to legitimate clients. This means any incoming requests willbe blocked, thus, denying service to clients.

A SYN flood is a type of Layer 4 DDoS attack where an attacker or groupof attackers send a large succession of SYN requests to a server in anattempt to overwhelm the server, which if not properly configured canlimit the server's ability to properly respond to incoming requests. Theattack works because the attackers will not respond properly to theserver's response, thus keeping open a connection and consuming memory,until it the connection times out, and is closed.

When such attacks occur, a lot of the server's resources get used upresponding to the attacks, and the default settings of the server arenot adequate to absorb the attack. This hurts mitigation efforts to keepthe service up. Embodiments can increase server tolerance in asystematic way to deal with these DDoS attacks.

II. Default Server Operation and Settings

The default settings on servers (e.g., Linux-based servers) are notoptimized to handle the strain of DDoS attacks. For example, the numberof connections is set an order of magnitude lower than is advised duringa Layer 4 DDoS attack. Consequently, the amount of memory set aside tohandle these connections is inadequate as well. The default settings areset for normal operations. Developers tend to overlook DDoS when tryingto figure out the best way to manage a system's network settings. Inmany cases, server operators simply setup the servers, which are thenforgotten about. Although one can manually change the settings fromtheir default state, this is done infrequently (if ever), and suchchanges may not be done correctly.

Ultimately, the server operator suffers because they are not able tobenefit from what is best for the server at all times, and clientssuffer not being able to connect to the server. With an increase in DDoSattacks, this practice is not adequate for maintaining a server thatwill continue to operate and serve its purpose optimally.

A partial list of problems with default server settings includes: hostsreplying to ICMP echo requests with spoofed target source; some routerssend bad ICMP frames in violation of RFC 1122; saving connection metricsin the route cache can lead to performance degradation; under duress, asystem receives packets faster than the kernel can process them leadingto “dropped packets;” the incoming packet queue is too small; theconnection table is filled with half open connections due to a SYNflood; not enough memory to accommodate additional connections;arbitrarily picked settings might cause more problems; connections intime_wait state prevent reuse of connections; severe SYN floods can fillup the time_wait bucket; the system file descriptor limit is too low;port exhaustion is caused by too many connections to the same backendserver address; a large amount of time is spent waiting for ingressconnection acknowledgement; time connections remain open too long (i.e.connection timeouts); the time waiting for a connection terminationrequest or the acknowledgement of a sent termination request is toolong; time awaiting remote termination requests too long; time spentwaiting on remote termination request acknowledgement too long; and timespent waiting on acknowledgement of termination request from remote toolong; time spent waiting to be sure the remote host received theconnection termination request too long.

Accordingly, embodiments can automatically adjust settings so that thesettings are optimal for whatever the operating conditions may be.Regardless if there is light traffic, heavy traffic, or under attack,the server can be optimally, automatically configured.

Additionally, embodiments can change settings in coordination with eachother. For example, the relationship between connections and memory isimportant but not always well understood by those trying to optimizeservers to better tolerate Layer 4 DDoS attacks. There is a lot of badinformation on the Internet that people use to address this problem.This results in changes to settings that leave the server vulnerable.For example, someone may increase the number of connections too high andfail to allocate enough memory to those additional connections. Asanother example, settings adjustments can take into account concernsabout caching, as well as conflicting settings. Accordingly, embodimentscan change settings in a coordinated fashion. For example, thresholdsmay be set so that two settings change at about the same time. In oneembodiment, a decrease/increase in one setting can automatically cause acorresponding change in another setting.

III. Detection of and Response to Changing Server Conditions

FIG. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a method 100 of modifying settings ofa server in response to an attack according to embodiments of thepresent invention. Method 100 is performed by a computer system that mayinclude one or more computers. When performed by multiple computers, thecomputers are connected by a network. Method may be performed by theserver, an external system, or a combination of both.

The server has a first set of resources that are used to respond toclient requests. Each resource of the first set is capable of beingincreased and decreased. An amount of a resource available forresponding to the client requests is specified by a resource setting.The first set of resources may have resource settings that are numericalvalue, and other resources may just be binary or a set number ofclassifications. Examples of such resources are provided in a followingsection.

At block 110, client requests made to the server are monitored. Theclient request can be monitored in various ways. For example, the serveror another system can submit requests to identify system resourcescurrently being used. For example, the size of a connection table can berequested.

At block 120, a first amount of a first resource of the first set thatis currently being used to respond to the client requests is determined.How the first amount is determined can depend on what the first resourceis. For example, the system can measure an average, median, or maximumtime measured for responding to the requests. As another example, atable size may be obtained to determine the number of connectionscurrently open.

At block 130, the first amount is compared to a first threshold. Thefirst threshold is less than a current value of a first resource settingcorresponding to the first resource. For example, the first resourcesetting may be a maximum allowed for the first resource, and the firstthreshold can be a specified percentage of the maximum.

At block 140, a value of the first resource setting can be increased inresponse to the first amount being larger than the first threshold.Thus, the amount of the first resource available to respond to clientrequests can be increased. In one embodiment, the first resource settingcan be increased by a specified percentage of the current value of thefirst resource setting. In another embodiment, the first resourcesetting is increased by a specified number.

After the value of the first resource setting is increased, the firstthreshold can be increased. Thus, when the monitoring continues, it canbe determined that the updated threshold is again surpassed by thecurrent amount of requests, and then the first resource setting can beincreased again.

As the monitoring continues, a new amount of the first resource that iscurrently being used to respond to the client requests can bedetermined. As mentioned, the new amount can continue to increase pastan updated threshold, resulting in a further increase. But, the newamount can also be less than the updated threshold (or some otherthreshold), and then the value of the first resource setting can bedecreased.

A second resource setting corresponding to a second resource can also beincreased in response to the first current amount being larger than thefirst threshold. The second resource setting can be increased by a sameamount that the first resource setting is increased.

A modification software routine (logic) can be used to makemodifications to a server to address the above problems with the defaultsettings. The modification routine can execute on any processor (or setof processors) that has access to an amount of resources currently beingused by the server. For example, the system can look at the environmentby having a program running in memory, constantly watching in thebackground and periodically analyzing the connection states of theserver, and recording that data and doing statistical analysis toestablish a baseline of normal operations. The normal state can varyfrom server to server, so the establishment of a baseline of normaloperations will provide a server-specific state of normal operations forfuture data to be compared against.

Embodiments can give a server an opportunity to recover faster fromattacks and have some resilience during an attack. For example, a TCPHardening system can help to ensure the availability of a server's TCPlayer to new connections during a transportation layer DDoS attack, andmodify the server's related settings to the appropriate levels duringtimes of normal operation. As examples, the system can employ threestrategies: (1) increasing the number of sessions the server can hold,(2) increasing memory allocation on the server, and (3) reducing sessiontimeouts so unused session resources can be allocated more quickly whenthe server is under attack.

The data this program receives can include the connections, the resourceusage, the incoming packet rate, the peak state, and the existingconnections. It can also make sure there is room for server tolerance togrow, which may be important because of the nature of DDoS attacks.

The system may have certain on/off switches that allow it to collectstatistics on the closed connections in order to help automaticallyoptimize the new connections to be opened. There may be features todisable under duress, and then re-enable when duress is over. Forexample, during a SYN flood attack, the creation of a bunch ofillegitimate connections creates false data that could ruin the server.So, the system would want to turn off the tracking of those connectionsduring an attack.

If the system detects abnormal behavior on the server, for exampleexcessive connection requests, the system can provide a way to identifysettings that are out of sync and start making adjustments based onobserved properties, such as connection usage, the number of connectiontimeout states , and whether you recycle or reuse those connections.

Essentially, for every parameter that is adjusted in the server setting,the system can analyze the data related to that parameter. For example,the system adjusts the incoming and overflow buffer depending on thestate of the server. The system can perform many observations of thesystem and make statistical calculations, including a logic tree thatresponds to situations where the collected data is a certain percentageabove or below the expected state, then make an adjustment to the serversettings. The system can allow server operators to benefit from nearoptimal server settings at all times, by updating the settings foroptimal server performance based on server conditions.

On the server level there are several things that the system can look atto determine changed conditions. These include, but are not limited tothe server load, the number of open connections, the amount of memorybeing used by the buffers, the incoming packet rate into the buffers.These are system variables on the server that can be examined, that leadto adjustment, upward or downward of server system parameters for thebest server performance, based on the incoming data.

The system can have a series of heuristic rules to adjust the systemparameters based on measurements of the server state. That is if thecurrently set system parameters are not adjusted correctly for thecurrent server state, the rules would be applied to adjust them toappropriate levels. For example, if the server settings are not in linewith the observed server load, number of open connections, memory usage,then readjust the server settings as appropriate. Depending on exactlywhere the current state of the server is, the system will choose theappropriate particular settings.

A modification routine may run on a cyclical basis of for example everysecond or two seconds poll the server to see if changes are needed toserver parameters.

One set of rules could consist of increase the available resources up toa maximum amount if the observed values are above a threshold. Likewise,if the system has restored to a normal state after recovering from anattack, the server settings can be restored to those for normaloperation. The adjustments to server settings can be proportional to theobserved deviation from the expected normal state.

As an example imagine a monitoring process running and a particularmonitored system parameter having a default maximum allowed value of100,000. A rule could exist that if the observed value for this waswithin 80% of the maximum value, then raise the number up say another10% or 20% to provide a slow increase to the available resources. Thesystem would be responding to increased demand, but not excessively.Then later on, if the observed value fell down to 70% of maximum, theavailable resources would be reduced back down in 10% or 20% incrementsback down to the default level of 100,000 over a series of observations.This would decrease the server resources consumed to an appropriatelevel.

IV. Example Server Settings

The following are a series of examples of modifications to certainserver parameters and the logic for such modifications. Many of theparameters discussed can be found on a standard Linux-based operatingsystem in configuration files like /proc for live settings or at/etc/sysct1.conf that has settings that will persist through a serverreboot/shutdown. Embodiments can modify the configuration file or filesand enable the changes in the system. The modifications can beimplemented by a routine executing on the server itself and/or on aseparate system. In some implementations, the routine can execute mostefficiently on the at-risk server.

Certain modifications are to parameters only having binary values, inthat the parameters should be enabled or disabled during periods ofdetected attack or conversely, normal operation. Other settings can benumerical or of multiple classifications, and can be increased ordecreased in response to current conditions.

As a 1st example, a setting can ignore ICMP echo requests from broadcastaddress prevent computer from participating is this type of attack. Thesystem could set net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=1 to effectuatethis change.

As a 2nd example, by ignoring bad ICMP frames, the system may preventunnecessary log entries, and decrease memory utilization during times ofdetected attack. The system could setnet.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=1 to effectuate this change.

As a 3rd example, if tcp_no_metrics_save is enabled, TCP will not cachemetrics on closing connections. Metrics are not very useful for highconnection rate environments. So, by disabling metrics the system canincrease the server resilience to SYN floods by saving on the overheadof tracking metrics. Additionally, DDoS attacks would cause falsemetrics to be generated since DDoS based connections are not legitimate.Systems not under duress would want these metrics for the performancegains. The system could set net.ipv4.tcp_no_metrics_save=1 to effectuatethis change.

As a 4th example, to prevent “dropped packet” messages, the system couldincrease the maximum backlog by an order of magnitude. For example,multiplying the default backlog by 10 seems to alleviate this issue. Forinstance, the system could set net.core.netdev_max_backlog=10000 toeffectuate this change. Such a resource setting can correspond to thelength of the packet input queue.

As a 5th example, the incoming packet queue is generally very small bydefault, so raising this value to be equal with the backlog ensures thelog will be cleared out fast, and the packets processed through asquickly as possible. This assumes a default of 128 sockets. The systemcould set net.core.somaxconn=10000 or an appropriate socket value toeffectuate this change Such a resource setting can correspond themaximum number of backlogged packets (e.g., sockets). Backlogged packetsare packets sitting and waiting to be processed by the server.

As a 6th example, increasing the number of available connections canhelp the server deal with a SYN flood. The default setting of 31,764connections can be increased to a much larger and appropriate value, forexample 2̂19 available connections to keep even large SYN flood attacksat bay when combined with other changes. The system could setnet.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max=524288, or an appropriate level ofconnections to effectuate this change.

As a 7th example, increasing the number of connections is a big help,but there may not be enough memory to accommodate the additionalconnections. There are three buffers to for handling TCP connections:the read, write, and internal buffers. These buffers are auto-calculatedon boot and they are based on the total system memory size. The threebuffer size variables are the following:

net.ipv4.tcp_mem low pressure highnet.ipv4.tcp_rmem low pressure highnet.ipv4.tcp_wmem low pressure highLow, pressure and high are numerical values. Low is the normal amount ofmemory set aside for buffer activities. Pressure is when the TCP bufferis using this much memory, the kernel begins to put pressure on opensockets for them to close until usage falls below the low value. High iswhen the memory buffer has reached this size, packets will be droppeduntil the buffer usage shrinks below this value. Each value representsthe number of memory pages allocated for each buffer and the buffers aredynamically re-sized as needed.

The server may have the setting of six megabytes for low, and 12megabytes for pressure and 24 megabytes for high for one of the aboveparameters. As an example, that setting can be acceptable if you don'thave a very popular server or popular website at all. The pressure is at12 megabytes, so the server will automatically allow more memory up tothe 12 megabytes. Once it hits that pressure number of 12 megabytes, theserver will try to close connections, in order to free up space.However, the server will allow the user of more memory up to the high of24 megabytes. Once the server hits the 24 megabyte cap, no moreconnections will be permitted. Connections will be declined and closed,which is a problem that servers under attack experience. If an attackruns the server out of connection memory, then “Out of socket memory”errors will be experienced.

The auto adjustment mechanism of the system will review these values andjust increase them dynamically when it detects that the limits are beingreached. Likewise after an attack, the system can readjust the memorylevels appropriately. As an example, a rule could be that once memoryreaches 80% of the high level, then double the available memory.

As an 8th example, many modern operating systems set the page size to 4kilobytes. The actual size can be verified using the command “getconfPAGE_SIZE.” By and large, these values can be left alone, but there maybe cases where “Out of socket memory” messages populate the logs andthese values would have to be adjusted on a per case basis. There aremany guides on the Internet which appear to be based on TCP “voodoo”with magical settings. Picking arbitrary numbers might actually causemore problems, so these values need to be adjusted with care. The systemparameters are net.ipv4.tcp_mem, net.ipv4.tcp_rmem, andnet.ipv4.tcp_wmem.

As a 9th example, the reuse of connections in a time wait state canreduce the impact of SYN floods. Even in high traffic sites, connectionsthat have decayed into a time_wait state can be immediately reused fornew connections. The system could set net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse=1 toeffectuate this change.

As a 10th example, under severe SYN flood conditions, there is apossibility of filling up the time wait socket bucket. Generally thedefault value is sufficient; however, this value can be configured whenneeded. The system adjusting of set net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse=1 eliminatesthe need for modifying this setting in most cases. The adjustment istypically needed if messages like the following were found in the logs:“TCP: time wait bucket table overflow.” The default is 65535 tw sockets.The system could adjust the value of net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_bucketsappropriately to effectuate this change.

As an 11th example, adjusting the system file descriptor limit providesmore capacity to do work on the server, because all processes in Linuxuse file handles. A general heuristic is 256 handles per 4 megabytes ofmemory However, 4 GB has generally been sufficient, meaning settingfs.file-max=262144, from the operating system default of 65535system-wide descriptors. This value could be further be adjusted asneeded.

As a 12th example, when servers are very busy and suffer from portexhaustion, meaning that there are too many connections to the samebackend server address, a fix is to increase the number of ports orcreate an additional proxy with a different source address. The defaultpermits 28232 connections to the same address from the same address,that is from one machine to the server. If this count is exceeded, therewill be connection problems. The default range is 32768 61000 (28232ports). The max range is from 1024 to 65535, resulting in 64511 ports.The system could adjust the value of net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range=102465535 to effectuate this change.

As a 13th example, generally, running connection timeouts at 50% of thedefault values can be used, since it causes connections to close twiceas fast. Under duress, these values can be modified as needed. The timespent waiting for ingress connection acknowledgement is a criticalsetting to evaluate under a SYN flood. Historically, under heavy flood,9 to 15 seconds is sufficient. The higher that can be gotten away withand still maintain normal operations, the better to prevent trouble forlegitimate users. The default ingress value is 60. The system could setnet.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_syn_recv=30 to effectuate thischange. Since the local system is not sending DDoS traffic, leaving theegress default value is fine, but it can also be adjusted to 50% forconsistency. The default value for egress is 120. The system could setnet.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_syn_sent=60 to effectuate thischange.

This setting has to do with how TCP works. What can happen is a remotehost will, initiate the TCP handshake, telling the server, “Hello, I'mhere, want to connect?”, sending a SYN. The server will respond with anACK packet indicating that a connection will be accepted. Then theserver will reserve a space in its memory for that incoming connection;even when the connection has not been established. However, when theremote machine is an attacker, they will not respond to the ACK, leavingthe server waiting. This timeout adjusts that time between when theserver ACK, and the permitted response time. By reducing this to as lowa value as the server could possibly can and still not drop legitimatetraffic, the server can mitigate DDoS attacks. This value should beadjusted dynamically, because people that are further away from theserver or have high latency could suffer trying to connect if, if it isset too low. At the same time, during an attack, the value should belowered to drop illegitimate connections from the attacker.

As a 14th example, The time that a connection should remain open, shouldbe carefully adjusted. If it is too short, normal connections will droptoo fast. For basic web page browsing the 180 second value issufficient. This is an example of a variable that needs to be readjustedafter an attack has completed, in order to resume normal operations. Ifthe customer has applications such as chat or games that require longconnection times this value should be increased. The default value is432000. The system could setnet.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_established=180 to effectuatethis change.

As a 15th example, in the first stage of closing a connection(fin-wait-1), the server is waiting for a remote connection terminationrequest or the acknowledgement of a sent termination request. This canbe adjusted downward under duress to >=5 seconds. The default is 120.The system could adjustnet.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_fin_wait=60 to effectuate thischange.

As a 16th example, in the second stage of closing a connection(fin-wait-2), the system awaits a remote termination request. This canbe adjusted downward under duress to >=5 seconds. The default value is60. The system could set net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout=30 to effectuate thischange.

As a 17th example, the system could reduce how long the server waits forthe other end of the connection to acknowledge the connectiontermination request. This can be adjusted downward under duress to >=3seconds. The default value is 10. The system could setnet.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_close=5 to effectuate thischange.

As an 18th example, the system could reduce the time spent by the serverwaiting on acknowledgement of a termination request from a remote systemto have the acknowledgement including the acknowledgements oftermination requests from remote host. This can be adjusted downwardunder duress to >=3 seconds. The default value is 30. The system couldset net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_last_ack=15 to effectuatethis change.

As a 19th example, the system could reduce the time the server spendswaiting to be sure the remote host received a connection terminationrequest. This value does not need to be adjusted so long as tcp_tw_reuseor recycle is enabled. This setting is included for completeness though.The default value is 120. The system could setnet.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_time_wait=60 to effectuate thischange.

For the timeout values, the system generally wants to lower them duringan attack. A heuristic adjustment of around 50% of the default valuesduring an attack can help mitigate, and then further adjustment ifneeded.

When an attack is no longer ongoing, the settings can be returned todefault value, or decreased, potentially returning to the defaultsetting.

V. Computer System

Any of the computer systems mentioned herein may utilize any suitablenumber of subsystems. Examples of such subsystems are shown in FIG. 2 incomputer apparatus 10. In some embodiments, a computer system includes asingle computer apparatus, where the subsystems can be the components ofthe computer apparatus. In other embodiments, a computer system caninclude multiple computer apparatuses, each being a subsystem, withinternal components.

The subsystems shown in FIG. 2 are interconnected via a system bus 75.Additional subsystems such as a printer 74, keyboard 78, storagedevice(s) 79, monitor 76, which is coupled to display adapter 82, andothers are shown. Peripherals and input/output (I/O) devices, whichcouple to I/O controller 71, can be connected to the computer system byany number of means known in the art such as input/output (I/O) port 77(e.g., USB, FireWire®). For example, I/O port 77 or external interface81 (e.g. Ethernet, Wi-Fi, etc.) can be used to connect computer system10 to a wide area network such as the Internet, a mouse input device, ora scanner. The interconnection via system bus 75 allows the centralprocessor 73 to communicate with each subsystem and to control theexecution of instructions from system memory 72 or the storage device(s)79 (e.g., a fixed disk, such as a hard drive or optical disk), as wellas the exchange of information between subsystems. The system memory 72and/or the storage device(s) 79 may embody a computer readable medium.Any of the data mentioned herein can be output from one component toanother component and can be output to the user.

A computer system can include a plurality of the same components orsubsystems, e.g., connected together by external interface 81 or by aninternal interface. In some embodiments, computer systems, subsystem, orapparatuses can communicate over a network. In such instances, onecomputer can be considered a client and another computer a server, whereeach can be part of a same computer system. A client and a server caneach include multiple systems, subsystems, or components.

It should be understood that any of the embodiments of the presentinvention can be implemented in the form of control logic using hardware(e.g. an application specific integrated circuit or field programmablegate array) and/or using computer software with a generally programmableprocessor in a modular or integrated manner. As used herein, a processorincludes a single-core processor, multi-core processor on a sameintegrated chip, or multiple processing units on a single circuit boardor networked. Based on the disclosure and teachings provided herein, aperson of ordinary skill in the art will know and appreciate other waysand/or methods to implement embodiments of the present invention usinghardware and a combination of hardware and software.

Any of the software components or functions described in thisapplication may be implemented as software code to be executed by aprocessor using any suitable computer language such as, for example,Java, C, C++, C#, Objective-C, Swift, or scripting language such as Perlor Python using, for example, conventional or object-orientedtechniques. The software code may be stored as a series of instructionsor commands on a computer readable medium for storage and/ortransmission, suitable media include random access memory (RAM), a readonly memory (ROM), a magnetic medium such as a hard-drive or a floppydisk, or an optical medium such as a compact disk (CD) or DVD (digitalversatile disk), flash memory, and the like. The computer readablemedium may be any combination of such storage or transmission devices.

Such programs may also be encoded and transmitted using carrier signalsadapted for transmission via wired, optical, and/or wireless networksconforming to a variety of protocols, including the Internet. As such, acomputer readable medium according to an embodiment of the presentinvention may be created using a data signal encoded with such programs.Computer readable media encoded with the program code may be packagedwith a compatible device or provided separately from other devices(e.g., via Internet download). Any such computer readable medium mayreside on or within a single computer product (e.g. a hard drive, a CD,or an entire computer system), and may be present on or within differentcomputer products within a system or network. A computer system mayinclude a monitor, printer, or other suitable display for providing anyof the results mentioned herein to a user.

Any of the methods described herein may be totally or partiallyperformed with a computer system including one or more processors, whichcan be configured to perform the steps. Thus, embodiments can bedirected to computer systems configured to perform the steps of any ofthe methods described herein, potentially with different componentsperforming a respective steps or a respective group of steps. Althoughpresented as numbered steps, steps of methods herein can be performed ata same time or in a different order. Additionally, portions of thesesteps may be used with portions of other steps from other methods. Also,all or portions of a step may be optional. Additionally, any of thesteps of any of the methods can be performed with modules, circuits, orother means for performing these steps.

The specific details of particular embodiments may be combined in anysuitable manner without departing from the spirit and scope ofembodiments of the invention. However, other embodiments of theinvention may be directed to specific embodiments relating to eachindividual aspect, or specific combinations of these individual aspects.

The above description of exemplary embodiments of the invention has beenpresented for the purposes of illustration and description. It is notintended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise formdescribed, and many modifications and variations are possible in lightof the teaching above. The embodiments were chosen and described inorder to best explain the principles of the invention and its practicalapplications to thereby enable others skilled in the art to best utilizethe invention in various embodiments and with various modifications asare suited to the particular use contemplated.

A recitation of “a”, “an” or “the” is intended to mean “one or more”unless specifically indicated to the contrary. The use of “or” isintended to mean an “inclusive or,” and not an “exclusive or” unlessspecifically indicated to the contrary.

All patents, patent applications, publications, and descriptionsmentioned herein are incorporated by reference in their entirety for allpurposes. None is admitted to be prior art.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of modifying settings of a server inresponse to an attack, the method comprising: monitoring client requestsmade to the server, the server having a first set of resources that areused to respond to client requests, each resource of the first set beingcapable of being increased and decreased, wherein an amount of aresource available for responding to the client requests is specified bya resource setting; determining a first amount of a first resource ofthe first set that is currently being used to respond to the clientrequests; comparing the first amount to a first threshold, the firstthreshold being less than a current value of a first resource settingcorresponding to the first resource; and in response to the first amountbeing larger than the first threshold, increasing a value of the firstresource setting, thereby increasing the amount of the first resourceavailable to respond to client requests.
 2. The method of claim 1,wherein the first resource setting is a maximum amount of the firstresource that is available.
 3. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising: increasing the first threshold after the value of the firstresource setting is increased.
 4. The method of claim 2, wherein thefirst threshold is a specified percentage of the current value of thefirst resource setting.
 5. The method of claim 2, wherein the firstthreshold is a specified number.
 6. The method of claim 2, wherein thefirst resource corresponds to a number of connections available toclient devices.
 7. The method of claim 2, wherein the first resourcecorresponds to a number of backlog client requests that are stored atthe server.
 8. The method of claim 2, wherein the first resourcecorresponds to a number of connections that are allowed to bebacklogged.
 9. The method of claim 2, wherein the first resourcecorresponds to an amount of memory used to provide connections to clientdevices.
 10. The method of claim 2, wherein the first resourcecorresponds to a number of ports available to client devices.
 11. Themethod of claim 2, wherein the first resource corresponds to an amountof time before a connection to a client device times out.
 12. The methodof claim 1, wherein the first resource setting is increased by aspecified percentage of the current value of the first resource setting.13. The method of claim 1, wherein the first resource setting isincreased by a specified number.
 14. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising: increasing a second resource setting corresponding to asecond resource in response to the first current amount being largerthan the first threshold.
 15. The method of claim 14, wherein the secondresource setting is increased by a same amount that the first resourcesetting is increased.
 16. The method of claim 1, wherein the firstresource setting is a numerical value.
 17. The method of claim 1,further comprising: detecting an attack on the server; and changing asecond resource setting for a second resource of a second set ofresources, the second resource setting having two possible values. 18.The method of claim 1, further comprising: continuing to monitor clientrequests made to the server; determining a new amount of the firstresource that is currently being used to respond to the client requests;comparing the new amount to a second threshold, the second thresholdbeing less than a current value of a first resource settingcorresponding to the first resource; and in response to the new currentamount being less than the second threshold, decreasing a value of thefirst resource setting.
 19. The method of claim 18, wherein the firstresource setting is decreased by a specified percentage of the currentvalue of the first resource setting.
 20. The method of claim 18, whereinthe first resource setting is decreased by a specified number.
 21. Themethod of claim 18, wherein the second threshold is the same as thefirst threshold.
 22. The method of claim 1, wherein the first amount isdetermined at a first time, the method further comprising: determining asecond amount of a second resource of the first set at the first time;comparing the second amount to a second threshold, the second thresholdbeing less than a current value of a second resource settingcorresponding to the second resource; and in response to the secondamount being larger than the second threshold, increasing a value of thesecond resource setting, thereby increasing the amount of the secondresource available to respond to client requests.
 23. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the method is performed by the server, an externalsystem, or a combination of both.